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I. Introduction
The founding document of the United States declares that all men are created equal.
However, history has shown that this is not the case. Citizens in this country have been
discriminated against since its inception based on their race, gender, religion, sexual orientation,
national origin, and many other factors. The first Federal Legislation passed to prevent
discrimination against citizens in the United States did not come until 1968, which “made it a
crime to use, or threaten to use, force to willfully interfere with any person because of race,
color, religion, or national origin” (United States, Department of Justice). It took until 2009 when
the hate crime laws were expanded to include crimes committed because of the victim’s
perceived or actual sexual orientation or gender identity. Hate crimes are now described as
“offenses involving an actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity, or disability” (18 U.S.C. § 249).
Prior to the 2016 election, the number of hate crimes were steadily decreasing during
President Obama’s time in office (Koski and Bantley 2019). This is thought to be due to several
laws and executive orders passed by President Obama to enhance protections for members of the
LGBTQ+ community, like the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention
Act, which added sexual orientation, disability, and gender identity to hate crime laws. The
Supreme Court also held in Obergefell v. Hodges that state bans on same-sex marriages and bans
on recognizing same-sex marriages in another jurisdiction were unconstitutional under the
Fourteenth Amendment. However, in 2015, the year that Donald Trump began his campaign for
presidency, hate crime numbers began to rise (Uniform Crime Reports).
Griffin Edwards and Stephen Rushin (2018) conducted a study to examine the trends in
the hate crimes that have been reported from 1992 through 2017 to examine if there was a
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relationship between Trump’s rise to power, the rhetoric he used throughout his election, the
hate-speech he used after he had won, and increased trends in hate crimes. They examined what
is called the “Trump Effect.” The Trump Effect was named as such because the number of hate
crimes appeared to increase as a result of Trump’s intentionally divisive and inflammatory
rhetoric throughout his campaign.
Indeed, it is not difficult to find instances of Donald Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric, as
he began his campaign for presidency saying that he wanted to build a wall to keep out
undocumented immigrants and that “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their
best” alleging that they are criminals (Cohn 2016). Another instance occurred after he had won
the presidency and was discussing immigration, once again calling the people that have been
deported under his presidency, “animals” (Sankin and Carless 2018). Edwards and Rushin
(2018) would go on to hypothesize that it was not only Trump’s inflammatory rhetoric
throughout his campaign that led to an increase in hate crimes throughout the United States, but
the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States validated his rhetoric in
the eyes of perpetrators and fueled the increase in hate crimes. Indeed, the authors found that
the largest increases in hate crimes occurred in counties that voted for Trump.
This thesis will expand upon that prior research of the Trump Effect by looking at the
rates of right-wing extremist homicides committed in three time periods from 2010 through 2021
(Pre-Trump, Trump, and Post-Trump) to examine if there is a relationship between Trump’s
instances of hate speech and right-wing extremist homicides. Essentially, the existing research
suggests that hate crime increased, but none of the existing research indicates whether Trump’s
rhetoric cost lives. This paper also examines whether Trump’s rhetoric impacted the rates of
right-wing perpetrated minority homicides, and whether right-wing incidents became more
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violent as measured by the number of deaths per event. This project will analyze these questions
using the American Terrorism Study’s Bias Homicide Database (BHDB) located here at the
University of Arkansas.
II. Literature Review
Before examining the bias homicide rates, it is important to examine the previous
research that has been conducted on political rhetoric, mass psychology, and how the Trump
Effect has influenced society.
Political Rhetoric
Political rhetoric is defined as “the ways in which politicians try to persuade various
audiences and to the (academic) study of such oratory” (Tileagă 2013). Violent political rhetoric
has been used throughout history by politicians as a form of propaganda to polarize society,
mobilize their supporters, disparage rivals, and “pave the way for further violence that is
politically beneficial to them” (Zeitzoff 2018). In xamining the effects that violent political
rhetoric can have on aggression, on support for political violence (including threats against
leaders, property violence, and physical violence against leaders), Nathan Kalmoe (2014) found
that citizens who had aggressive personality traits were significantly more likely to support
political violence. This support doubled when exposed to mild violent metaphors within political
messages, especially for younger adults who are more likely to engage in aggressive behavior.
Although a direct link could not be made between the relationship of violent rhetoric and violent
behavior, Kalmoe (2014) suggested that political violence can be a risk factor for violent
behavior and milder forms of political aggression. He also found that “political leaders –
wittingly or not – mobilize aggression in audiences with violent metaphors, priming the
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aggressive predispositions that guide citizens in everyday life” (Kalmoe, 2014:22). It should be
noted that the language that was used in this study was very tame, and the targets of these violent
metaphors were policy problems and not people or groups of people. That demands a question:
what happens when the language used is violent and directed at a person or group of people?
Many studies have been conducted showing a relationship between aggression and
exposure to violent media through speech, pictures, video games, music, and text (Anderson and
Bushman 2001; Bushman 1995; Bushman and Geen 1990). Nugent and Conway (2021)
examined violent political rhetoric and other factors on the rate of mass shootings in the country.
They found that violent political rhetoric was positively associated with mass shootings and
hypothesized that this was because “VPR [violent political rhetoric] may stimulate racism,
xenophobia, and anger towards those who have been the targets of the VPR and help erode social
norms against violence. The VPR would legitimize the use of violence in the minds of those
amenable to such rhetoric.” Levine (2018) found support for this hypothesis in the five years
since Trump announced his candidacy for president, as there were at least 54 cases in the United
States of perpetrators of violence, threats, and alleged assaults against minorities invoking
Trump’s name. Other researchers found a 226% increase in hate crimes committed in counties
that hosted a Donald Trump rally during his election campaign (Feinberg, Branton, and
Martinez-Ebers 2019). Interestingly, it can be inferred from these 54 cases of violence that
Levine (2018) referenced, of perpetrators who directly referred to Trump, that violent political
rhetoric can inspire people to commit acts of violence. The Trump Effect has been tested in
many studies such as Edwards and Rushin’s work (2018) mentioned earlier as well as research
conducted by Newman et al. (2021) in which they found that those who were already prejudiced
and read a statement from Trump disparaging Latinos were significantly more likely to express

4

their prejudice, but even more so when other “elites” condoned Trump’s statements and
behavior. The key findings from this study were that when other elites, like other politicians in
the Republican party, do not condemn these types of violent political rhetoric from Trump, that it
signals to those who are already prejudiced that the social climate has changed, and it is no
longer unacceptable to express this prejudice. For example, Scott and Steven Leader committed
violence against minorities when they urinated, punched, and beat a sleeping homeless man of
Mexican descent before saying “Donald Trump was right, all these illegals need to be deported”
(Herndon 2016).
Donald Trump’s rhetoric not only targets minority groups, but also targets the media and
other politicians. Trump targeted the media and said he intended to “discredit you all [the media]
and demean you all so that when you write negative stories about me no one will believe you”
(Mangan 2018). In an article examining Trump’s rhetoric and political violence, Brigitte L.
Nacos, et al. (2020) argues that the tactic used by Trump to discredit the media is similar to what
Hitler and his propagandists did to the independent German news media in the 1930’s. The
authors state that hateful rhetoric of this kind is especially dangerous for the targets when the
person saying these things is a “powerful [individual] in the public sphere with fanatical
followers.” This is demonstrated by one man who, in responding to a Trump post, put a swastika
under his comment and said, “I was like, literally, tearing my eyes out watching Trump’s speech!
I literally exploded. It was like literally 1933. He’s literally Hitler!” (Nacos et al, 2020:5). These
types of comments are in line with Newman et al’s (2021) study and show the power that
someone in the highest office in the country can have on their supporters and the ways that they
can mobilize them to commit acts of violence. These findings are also outlined in Nugent and
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Conway’s (2021) work, as well as in Nacos et al.’s (2020) article of political violence with
perpetrators influenced by Trump.
Mass Psychology
Donald Trump’s campaign slogan “Make America Great Again” was chosen for a very
specific reason: to create an ingroup with his own supporters and an outgroup of everyone else
(Samuelson 2016). Social categorization is used to classify the countless individuals we know
into groups and is done to make recalling information about who they are, and other
characteristics, easier. These characteristics could include someone’s sex, age, race, and even
who their favorite MLB team is. However, these categorizations can lead to the creation of
ingroups and outgroups. There have been numerous studies conducted on the relationships
between ingroups and outgroups, especially with stereotypes, through Harvard’s Implicit
Association Tests. According to Robert J. Samuelson (2016), Trump has used his rhetoric and
his slogan to get his supporters to “displace their anger and frustration onto groups that (in
Trump’s view) have eroded America’s “greatness” — Mexicans, Muslims, the Chinese, political
and financial elites, and “the media.” Through his rhetoric, Trump has been able to create his
own fanatical ingroup of mainly straight white males who feel that the reasons for why they are
failing themselves is because of the outgroup that Trump targets in his speeches (Brownstein,
2016). Brownstein argues that Trump’s rhetoric appeals to a sense of white nostalgia among his
supporters in which he uses the words “again” and “back” to signal to his voters that if he is
elected president, America will go back to the time in which the white male culture dominated.
His wording is deliberate and appeals to people who feel the changes that have come in America
have disparaged them economically, demographically, and culturally and the reasons for their
disparagement are the outgroup that he has created. The times that Trump refers to are times in
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which many racial and religious minorities, gays, and transgender people lived in fear from the
very people who are supporting Trump and want to “Make America Great Again.”
This sense of white nostalgia is not alone in the type of nostalgia that Trump uses in his
rhetoric and slogan. National Nostalgia a type of collective nostalgia in which citizens of a
country self-categorize as members of that country and then feel a collective remembrance of a
countries “good old days” (Behler et al., 2021). This type of nostalgia can lead to the exclusion
of other members of the country, such as those who have immigrated to the country recently or
minorities inside that country. In America, Trump has combined the white nostalgia talked about
in the Atlantic article with this national nostalgia to make people want to go back to a time in
which straight white men were the controlling power at the expense of the minorities in the
country.
Behler et al., (2021) tested this phenomenon of national nostalgia and found that national
nostalgia was positively associated with pro-Trump attitudes and both anti-black racial prejudice
as well as perceived realistic threat. For those moderate to high in racial prejudice, national
nostalgia predicted their pro-Trump attitudes (Behler et al., 2021). These findings are consistent
with Newman et al., (2021) who found in that more prejudiced individuals were more likely to
express their prejudice. One surprising result from this study was that white Republicans rated
their racial identity as more important to them than did black participants. This is shocking as
research has found that, normally, white individuals are less likely than people of color to think
of their race when they think of themselves (Steck et al., 2003).
Steck et al., (2003) argue that the perceived threat from the racial outgroups that Trump
has invoked through national nostalgia could explain why white individuals may have voted for
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Trump. Many politicians have used, and currently use, psychological strategies to try to amass
voters to win elections, but nobody has gone to the extreme levels of violent political rhetoric
that Trump has used throughout his campaign and presidency. Moreover, it is difficult to find
another contemporary American politician who has had a more powerful direct negative effect
on the people that he is supposed to represent.
The Trump Effect in Society
Some might argue that Trump’s violent rhetoric is just words used to rally support for
election day and nothing more. But what impact do they actually have? There are many
instances across the country that seem to show his hateful rhetoric has permeated through all
levels of society and do in fact have a huge impact on his constituents. Directly after Trump was
elected, teachers reported an increase in the number of targeted instances of harassment in
majority white schools towards immigrants, Muslims, girls, LGBT students, kids with
disabilities and anyone who was on the “wrong” side of the election (SPLC 2016; Costello
2016). This targeted harassment and discrimination was new to their schools as one elementary
teacher from Georgia stated “this is my 21st year of teaching. This is the first time I’ve had a
student call another student the ‘n’ word. This incident occurred the day after a conference with
the offender’s mother. During the conference, the mother made her support of Trump known and
expressed her hope that ‘the blacks’ would soon ‘know their place again’” (SPLC 2016). This
type of language showing up in elementary schools is very alarming and shows the effect that
Trump’s rhetoric has had on his supporters.
Similarly, Newman et al.’s (2021) argues that Trump emboldens people to think that
society has shifted, and that now it is fine to express their prejudicial views. In schools that have
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large populations of people of color, there was a collective sense of fear and anxiety because of
the results of the election, especially among immigrants who worried about deportation and
family separation as a result of the election (SPLC 2016; Costello 2016). Donald Trump has not
shied away from using violent political rhetoric in his speeches and rallies as evidenced in his
announcement speech of his running for presidency when he said, “When Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best. They’re not sending you. They’re not sending you.
They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good
people” (Cineas 2020).
Language like this is harmful to people who are the targets of violent political rhetoric.
The harm is demonstrated by examples of students fearing deportation and separation from their
families, and it has also been documented in scientific studies. Chavez et al., (2019) showed a
sample of Mexican-origin college students varied images and texts of political rhetoric, some of
them positive, some negative, and some neutral. They tested the affect, perceived stress,
subjective health, and subjective well-being of the participants. Some of the participants
completed the study before and some completed it after the election of Donald Trump. Negative
political rhetoric was significantly associated with higher negative emotions and the opposite
was true for positive emotions (Chavez et al., 2019). Negative emotions were associated with
significantly higher perceived stress, lower perceived health, and lower subjected well-being.
Those participating in the study after the 2016 election of Donald Trump had higher perceived
stress and lower subjective well-being than those who participated in the study prior to Trump’s
election. This study highlights how dangerous violent political rhetoric is in that it can negatively
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affect the emotions and mental health of the targets of that rhetoric and can elicit feelings of hurt,
anger, distress, and anxiety (Chavez et al. 2019).
The Trump effect has not only entered the realm of education but has also infiltrated the
realm of therapy. Over 3,000 therapists signed a self-described manifesto declaring Trump’s
proclivity for scapegoating, intolerance, and blatant sexism a “threat to the well-being of the
people we care for” (Sheehy 2016). The President of the United States should not affect the
mental health of the very citizens that he is supposed to represent, especially not to the point that
therapists are worried about the well-being of their patients. One therapist noted that the Trump
Effect caused a lesbian patient to feel so unnerved while travelling through “Trumpish” areas of
the south that she hid her relationship with her same-sex partner over fear.
Political rhetoric is a very important factor in campaigns for office in our country and we
are exposed to them repeatedly during election time, especially for the presidential election.
What is unique about Trump’s rhetoric is the violent nature. Research has shown that it leads to
aggression and an increase in hate crime (Kalmoe, 2014; Nugent and Conway, 2021). What the
research has not shown, however, is what impact the Trump Effect has had on homicide rates.
So, my chief research question is to explore what impact Trump’s political rhetoric may have
had on bias homicides performed by persons politically aligned with him.
III. Methods
Throughout Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, as well as when he was in office, he
made many statements that can be categorized as hate speech. There have also been many
instances of his supporters committing hate crimes in his name because of some of the
statements that he made. After these crimes were committed, Trump was asked about them. The
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former President repeatedly refused to denounce the hate crimes perpetrated by his supporters
and instead made excuses for them, calling these people “very passionate” (Lind 2015). The
focus of this research will be bias homicides using the Bias Homicide Database, an open-source
database that includes information on violent crimes against social minorities. These data
include homicides that were officially classified as bias crimes by police as well as those that
were not (Gruenwald, K., 2015). This study focuses exclusively on bias homicides that occurred
in the United States. According to Gruenewald (2015), the use of homicide is noteworthy
because it is the most serious form of crime and the most consistently reported by law
enforcement and media sources (see also, Chermak, 1995; Graber, 1980). This database is
described in more detail below.
To measure whether the Trump Effect is a real phenomenon, and what impact it may
have had on bias homicide, I have relied on existing research to establish a few hypotheses.
Hypotheses
The Trump Effect has been noted as an increase in the hate crime rates thought to be due
to the intentionally divisive and inflammatory rhetoric used throughout Donald Trump’s
campaign and during his presidency (Edwards and Rushin 2018). To examine this effect
regarding bias homicides, the following hypotheses are offered:
H1 If the Trump Effect is an actual phenomenon, the frequency of right-wing bias
homicides should be higher after Donald Trump announced his candidacy for president
compared to the frequency of bias homicides prior to that event.
H2 If the Trump Effect is an actual phenomenon, the frequency of right-wing bias
homicides should decrease after the inauguration of President Biden compared to the
frequency of bias homicides during President Trump’s tenure.
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I further hypothesized that there will be an increase in the frequency of right-wing bias
homicides due to Trump’s rhetoric. To examine these hypotheses, the rates of right-wing
extremist homicides were measured in two eras. Originally, I had planned to use three-time
intervals (Pre-Trump, Trump, and Post-Trump), but the data from the third era is incomplete
(explained below). By examining the homicide rates before and during his campaign and
presidency, it is possible to examine whether there is a relationship between the instances of hate
speech and the proportion of bias homicides perpetrated by the right-wing.
Similarly, if the Trump effect is real, we should be able to measure its impact in other
ways. For instance, if Trump’s rhetoric impacted the types of victims targeted and the severity
of incidents, we should be able to measure that. Donald Trump has stated that his supporters are
“very passionate” about his beliefs and the statements that he has made (Lind 2015). However,
his messages have been inflammatory and divisive toward the minority groups that he has
targeted, particularly Hispanic persons and African Americans (Niedzwiadik, 2020). Thus, the
following hypothesis was proposed to examine the severity of bias homicides perpetrated by
right-wing groups.
H3 If the Trump Effect is real, the focus of bias homicides during Trump’s presidency
will likely be directed against a higher proportion of Hispanic and Black victims than
bias crimes prior to his candidacy.
H4 If the Trump Effect is real, the severity of hate crimes during Trump’s presidency
will likely be higher than before.
Data
I will be using data from the Bias Homicide Database (BHDB), which makes it possible
to examine the bias homicides that have been committed at the federal level, including those
perpetrated by rightwing and non-rightwing groups. There are other databases that collect
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information on this subject, like the American Terrorism Study, but the Bias Homicide Database
is currently the only dataset with enough data to analyze the era’s I intend to examine.
Moreover, the Bias Homicide Database is unique in that it collects data on violent bias crimes—
violent crimes directed at social minorities (Gruenewald, 2015). The Bias Homicide Database
(BHDB) was created in 2008 by Dr. Jeff Gruenewald and was initially a part of the U.S.
Extremist Crime Database. The BHDB is an open-source database containing offender, victim,
and incident-level data on all bias homicides occurring in the U.S. since 1990. In 2019, the
BHDB was integrated into the Terrorism Research Center (TRC) in the Department of Sociology
and Criminology at University of Arkansas.
An advantage of the BHDB is that it defines bias homicide as a felonious killing that is
associated with one or more indicators of bias or hate, without relying on police or prosecutors to
officially classify a homicide as a hate or bias crime. For a bias homicide to be included in the
BHDB, one or more offenders must be arrested and legally charged with some form of murder.
The indicators of bias used to define a homicide as bias include: verbal harassment prior, during,
or following the homicide; the location of the homicide, including symbolic sites; official hate
crime charge of an offender; police or prosecutor label it as a bias crime; the offender admits the
homicide was motivated at least in part by animus toward social minority victims; prior violence
towards minorities; mode of victim selection where the victim was identified or selected through
affiliation with a social minority group, organization, business, or engaging in an activity linked
to their social status; or a symbolic manipulation of the victims body (Terrorism Research Center
2019). The sample I’m using from the database consists of 206 incidents. The database contains
over 182 variables, of which I will pull the following: YearofIncident, FarRight,
NumberVictimDeaths, and VictimRace.
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I used SPSS to analyze these data, and performed a variety of analyses, including
Crosstabs and independent sample t-tests. The Bias Homicide Database contained information on
221 unique incidents of hate crimes committed during the eras analyzed. However, 15 were
removed because the database lacked information on right-wing affiliation for those cases. Of the
206 remaining cases, 25 of the incidents were classified as perpetrated by the far-right (12.1%)
and 181 were not affiliated with the far-right (87.9%).
I divided the sample into different time intervals based on the year of the offense with the
variable TimePeriod. The first era contained cases from 2010 to 2015 (Pre-Trump =1). This era
represents the five and a half years prior to Trump’s formal announcement of his candidacy for
presidency, which occurred on June 16, 2015. The second interval contains the five-and-a-halfyear period from 2015 to 2021 (Trump =2), which represents the period of his campaign and his
presidency. Donald Trump left office with Joe Biden’s inauguration on January 20, 2021.
Therefore, the last time interval included cases from January 20, 2021, to present (PostTrump=3).
IV. Findings
With the three era samples ready, I used the variable (FarRight) to set up my first
analysis. FarRight is a measure of whether the perpetrator of each case had ties to right-wing
extremism, and it allowed me to divide the sample into a dichotomous variable to distinguish
between right-wing crimes and all others (right-wing =1, other = 0). The BHDB defines
indicators of far-right affiliation as: self-admission of far-right affiliation; membership in
extremist group; verbal/written evidence of far-right ideology; witness testimony to offender farright affiliation; non-violent involvement in far-right extremist movement; bodily markings (e.g.,
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attire, tattoos), and possession of extremist literature (Terrorism Research Center 2019). I then
calculated the overall proportion of right-wing crimes by performing a frequency distribution
(results not shown). I ran the Pre-Trump and Trump eras in a crosstab. Again, in hypothesis
one, I posited that if the Trump Effect is an actual phenomenon, the frequency of right-wing bias
homicides should be higher after Donald Trump announced his candidacy for president
compared to the frequency of similar right-wing homicides prior to that event.
The results of the crosstab provided support for hypothesis 1. Prior to Donald Trump’s
announcement of his formal candidacy for president (Pre-Trump), right-wing hate crimes made
up just 7.2% of the total bias homicides committed during this era (See table 1). After his formal
announcement, bias homicides committed by the right-wing increased to 16.1% of the total
homicides committed during the Trump era. This data suggests that the proportion of right-wing
bias homicides nearly doubled after the announcement of Trump’s candidacy for president while
homicides committed by non-right-wing affiliated perpetrators decreased by the same
percentage. This finding was significant at the .001 level (X(1) = 59.78 p < .001).
Recall Hypothesis 2: If the Trump Effect is an actual phenomenon, the frequency of rightwing bias homicides should decrease after the inauguration of President Biden compared to the
frequency of bias homicides during President Trump’s tenure. Unfortunately, due to the low
number of incidents during the Post-Trump era (n=5), analysis is not yet possible. It appears that
data collection and coding of these most recent cases is ongoing. Nonetheless, I would like to
note anecdotally that none of the Post-Trump homicides in the database (at this point) were
committed by members of the right-wing. Though the crosstab was performed with Pre-Trump
and Trump eras, I presented the data for all three eras in Table 1.
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Table 1: Crosstabulation of Bias Homicides by Period and Far Right Affiliation (*PostTrump numbers added in combined results)
Time Period
Far Right?
Count
Percent within Time Period
Pre-Trump

Trump

*Post-Trump

Total
X2=59.78

df= 2

Yes
No
Total
Yes
No
Total
Yes
No
Total
Yes
No
Total
Sig < .001

6
77
83
19
99
118
0
5
5
25
181
206

7.2%
92.8%
100%
16.1%
83.9%
100%
0%
100%
100%
12.1%
87.9%
100%

Many violent right-wing organizations and far-right media outlets have embraced Trump
throughout his political career, for example, the official newspaper of the Ku Klux Clan, the
Crusader (Holley 2016). Because of their support for the president, the literature suggests that we
might expect an increase in the proportion of far-right bias homicides, but we should be able to
measure the Trump Effect in other ways. Due to the nature of the rhetoric that Trump has used
throughout the course of his political career, and his focus on Hispanic persons and the Black
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Lives Matter movement, we expect an increase in the number of attacks targeted towards
Hispanic and Black victims as compared to other social minorities (e.g., Asians, Mixed race,
etc.). Thus, the following hypothesis was proposed:
H3 If the Trump Effect is real, the focus of bias homicides during Trump’s presidency will
likely be directed against a higher proportion of Hispanic and Black victims than bias
crimes prior to his candidacy.
In testing hypothesis 3, I used the variable VictimRace to examine if there were
differences in the race of bias homicide victims across eras. Using this variable, I was able to run
a crosstabulation with the variable FarRight,v to analyze right-wing attacks during the PreTrump and Post-Trump eras to examine if there was a difference in the racial makeup of victims
over time.

Table 2:
Crosstabulation of Bias Homicides by Period, Race, and Far Right Affiliation
Period

Far
Right?

Victim Race White/Caucasian

Black

Hispanic Asian

MultiRacial

PreTrump

Far
Right

Count

9

3

0

0

0

1

13

% In Period

69.2%

23.1%

0%

0%

0%

7.7%

100%

Count

33

56

19

8

0

9

125

% In Period

26.4%

44.8%

15.2%

6.4%

0%

7.2%

100%

Count

8

20

44

3

0

1

76

% In Period

10.5%

26.3%*

57.9%**

3.9%

0%

1.3%

100%

Count

40

82

55

14

2

14

207

All
Other

Trump

Far
Right

All
Other

Other

Total

17

Total

% In Period

19.3%

39.6%

26.6%

6.8%

1.0%

6.8%

100%

Count

90

161

118

25

2

25

421

% Total

21.4%

38.2%

28%

5.9%

0.5%

5.9%

100%

*. significant at the .05 level
**. significant at the .001 level

Table 2 shows the racial composition of bias homicides committed by right-wing
offenders and non-right-wing offenders in the Pre-Trump and Trump eras. Crosstabulations
showed that for bias homicides, there were statistically significant differences between the eras
for only Hispanic and Black victims and only for Right-wing defendants. No other differences
between eras were significant for far-right or any other typology. These findings support the
hypothesis. In the Pre-Trump era, far-right groups did not target Hispanics, but in the Trump era,
Hispanic victims made up nearly 58% of the sample (p < .001). While not as large a difference,
the percent of Black victims also increased from 23% Pre-Trump, to 26.4% during the Trump era
(P< .05). To reiterate, the only significant changes in the racial composition of bias homicide
victims in the eras measured were an increase in the proportion of Hispanic and Black victims
targeted by far-right perpetrators.
Finally, I turn to hypothesis four, which states: If the Trump Effect is real, the severity of
hate crimes during Trump’s presidency will likely be higher, than before. To test this hypothesis,
I examined the number of victims per attack as a surrogate for severity. This makes sense as our
data consists of homicides, the only significant measure of severity would be the number of
victims per incident. The variable NumberVictimDeaths was used to examine whether the
number of victim deaths per attack increased during Trump’s presidency. I performed an
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independent samples T-Test, with era as the grouping variable (Pre-Trump and Trump) and
number of victim deaths per incident as the dependent (see Table 3). NumberVictimDeaths
recorded the number of victim deaths per incident.
This revealed a significant positive effect (t(545) =-4.288, p=< .001). The number of
attacks increased from 176 to 371, but the number of victims per attack more than doubled, from
1.29 victims per attack in the Pre-Trump era, to more than three victims per attack during
Trumps campaign and presidency.
Table 3:
Independent Samples t-Test Number of Deaths per incident by Time Period
N
Mean
Stand Dev.
Standard Error
Time Period
Number of deaths
Pre-Trump Era 176
1.29
1.147
.086
Trump Era
371
3.06
5.423
.282
t(545) =-4.288, p=< .001

V. Discussion
Existing literature suggested that the Trump Effect would lead to an increase in the hate
crime rates nationwide due to the violent political rhetoric that Trump used throughout his
campaign and presidency. The literature also suggested that violent political rhetoric can lead to
higher levels of aggression, especially in people pronte to aggression. The literature suggested
this occurs when political rhetoric validates the use of violence. This paper examined whether
these observations were true with regard to homicide rates. Focusing on bias homicide rates for
right-wing and non-right-wing perpetrators provides a measure of the Trump effect among the
most serious crimes. This project also focused on the impact of violent rhetoric on racial
composition of victims and the severity of crimes.
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The findings suggests not only that the Trump Effect had a real impact on right-wing
persons, consistent with prior literature, but it had a significant impact on the frequency and
severity bias homicides committed by these groups. Compared the era before Trump launched
his presidential bid, the bias homicide rates for the right-wing doubled in the years that followed
Trump’s announcement of his candidacy and his election. These findings are consistent with the
existing literature, which suggests that Trump’s intentionally inflammatory and divisive rhetoric
could be fanning the increase in violence. While a direct causal link cannot be drawn because
there could be other explanations that are not examined here, the results do suggest a correlation
and warrant more in-depth analysis in the future.
The literature suggests that the rhetoric Trump used throughout his candidacy and as
president targeted certain groups, especially minorities, and made the world a more dangerous
place for them.a Trump famously made numerous disparaging remarks about Hispanics, and he
often railed against the Black Lives Matter movement. His supporters rallied around a common
belief that these groups have eroded the “greatness” that Trump states that America needs to get
back to. The findings of this project are consistent with that literature and suggest that there was
a dramatic increase in the proportion of bias homicides against Blacks and Hispanics. These
findings do not establish a direct link between Trump’s rhetoric and the victimology of bias
homicides during the Trump era, but the results warrant serious consideration and future study,
as there was a marked increase in the bias homicide rates of the very minority groups Trump
targeted in his rhetoric. Most telling, the analysis showed that right-wing perpetrators had not
targeted Hispanic victims in the 5 years prior to Trump’s announcement to run for president. But
after Trump began making high profile disparaging remarks to frenzied crowds, Hispanics
became the most common target of right-wing bias homicide, at nearly 60 percent.
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The literature also found support for the proposition that violent political rhetoric was
positively associated with mass shootings, which suggests that dangerous rhetoric stimulates
racism, xenophobia, and anger towards the targets. This paper examined the severity of the bias
homicides committed during the different eras by examining the number of victim deaths that
occurred during each incident and found that there was a significant increase in the number of
victims between the different eras—the rate more than doubled. This suggests that Trump’s
rhetoric led to a dramatic increase in severity of the crimes committed. The findings are
disturbing.
Future Research
Since this paper only focused on the bias homicides that occurred from 2010-2021, it
would be beneficial to examine other types of hate crimes to explore whether other types of hate
crimes also significantly increased during Trump’s candidacy and presidential term, and whether
they demonstrated a similar impact on racial composition of victims and severity.
Due to there not being data available on many cases after Trump left office, it would be
beneficial to explore the bias homicide rates as well as other types of hate crimes in the future to
get a full grasp on whether the rates are going down since Trump left office.
VI. Conclusion
In examining the literature of hate crimes, no other study was found that examined the
bias homicide rates that occurred over the period studied making this potentially the first to
examine these homicide rates due to the “Trump Effect.” The findings of this paper not only
provide support that the Trump Effect is real, but also show that right-wing offenders committed
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significantly more homicides, targeted a greater percentage of Hispanic and Black victims, and
increased the severity of their crimes after Donald Trump announced his candidacy for president.
Examining the Trump Effect is important because no American politician has used the
extreme violent political rhetoric like Trump, and no politician has rallied their supporters around
beliefs that are intentionally violent towards certain groups of people. Disturbingly, this appears
to have a massive effect on the targets of the rhetoric. Donald Trump attracted a massive group
of devoted supporters that believed every word that he said, including his violent rhetoric, and
they believed that anyone who was not in their group threatened their place in this country. The
effect that Trump had on his supporters is evident by the unprecedented storming of the capital
that occurred on January 6th, 2021, in which his followers believed that the results of the 2020
election of Joe Biden were false, and that the election had been “stolen” from Trump. It is
important to examine what effect Trump’s violent rhetoric had on his supporters so that in the
future no other politician can use rhetoric similar to his, and to protect the mental and physical
health of the targets of violent political rhetoric.
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